Requirements become qualified capabilities through evidence.
Inspect every mission-critical function independently. The working VFS recovery release is one software boundary; hardware timing, isolation, redundancy and certification have their own acceptance gates.
Operate the VFS and native runtimeKEDDEH-CONTROL-ENTERPRISE-001 · v1.0 · Author Aboudy Keddeh — Systems Architect · Publisher Keddeh Systems · Rights holder Aboudy Keddeh · KEDDEH-RESERVED-1.0 · Public · Draft · Approval unset. Codex contributed implementation and documentation; no independent assessment implied.
MC01 · Hard real-time deadlines
Acceptance: Deadline and jitter budgets, WCET analysis, admitted workload and overload response
Observed boundary: Original carrier virtual scheduler; hosted JS event loops
Required evidence: Host RTOS and clock-qualified timing measurement; nanosecond guarantee not demonstrated
MC02 · Microkernel isolation
Acceptance: Independent address spaces, capability boundaries, MMU/IOMMU and restart containment
Observed boundary: Sandboxed document and authenticated server admission
Required evidence: Kernel, DMA and driver containment qualification
MC03 · Spatial / temporal partitioning
Acceptance: Fixed memory regions, CPU budgets and demonstrated starvation freedom
Observed boundary: Bounded checkpoint bytes and record quotas
Required evidence: Target-host partitions and measured interrupt/preemption budgets
MC04 · Zero runtime dynamic allocation
Acceptance: Allocation-free critical execution including libraries, queues and error paths
Observed boundary: Current DOM/JavaScript implementation allocates dynamically
Required evidence: Separate critical host implementation and heap/GC instrumentation
MC05 · Hardware redundancy
Acceptance: Independent channels, bounded voter latency and common-mode fault analysis
Observed boundary: No three-channel physical actuation demonstrated
Required evidence: Three hardware channel interfaces, voter design and fault-injection records
MC06 · AMP / SMP
Acceptance: Core affinity, interrupt ownership, cache interference and load budgets
Observed boundary: Virtual runtime processes are source-defined
Required evidence: Target cores, hardware scheduling and interference qualification
MC07 · IEEE 1588 timing
Acceptance: Grandmaster profile, PHY timestamping, asymmetry and holdover bounds
Observed boundary: Logical time retained in semantic continuations
Required evidence: Instrumented timestamp-capable nodes and network timing evidence
MC08 · Hardware cryptographic trust
Acceptance: Root provisioning, measured/verified boot, binary admission and key rotation
Observed boundary: SHA-256 custody of package/checkpoint bytes
Required evidence: HSM/TPM identity and actual binary verification path; hashes are not signatures
MC09 · Telemetry throughput
Acceptance: Sequence accounting, bounded buffering, backpressure and explicit loss alarms
Observed boundary: No million-point zero-loss result asserted
Required evidence: Frozen workload, rates, resource limits and overload/fault measurement
MC10 · Predictive detection
Acceptance: Model provenance, warning lead time, false alarm/miss rates and fallback
Observed boundary: No physics model qualification asserted
Required evidence: Dataset, trained model, baseline and held-out field evaluation
MC11 · Safe-mode orchestration
Acceptance: Hazard-dependent transition guards, watchdogs, priorities and recovery criteria
Observed boundary: Failed custody/readback is rejected without displaying verified state
Required evidence: Actual safety state machine and hardware interlocks for each sector
MC12 · Dual authorization
Acceptance: Distinct principals bound to command digest, expiry, expected state and independent interlocks
Observed boundary: Personal-volume deletion has confirmation and a durable tombstone
Required evidence: Separate mission-command authority registry and irreversible actuator; personal-data deletion is a different scope
MC13 · Formal assurance
Acceptance: Versioned model, theorem/invariant, assumptions, tool output and implementation refinement
Observed boundary: Deterministic regression and concurrency/fault tests
Required evidence: Machine-checked proof / bounded model-check receipt not supplied by tests
MC14 · State-machine control
Acceptance: Versioned transitions, complete guard conditions and invalid-transition rejection
Observed boundary: CAS revisions, same-event retry and terminal deletion state
Required evidence: Domain-specific mission transitions and sensor-interlock qualification
MC15 · Non-repudiation / WORM
Acceptance: Signing identity, trusted clock, retention enforcement and external audit readback
Observed boundary: Digest-linked custody records; no WORM or signature claim
Required evidence: Immutable retention configuration, signer/key custody and independent verifier
MC16 · SEU / hardware interface
Acceptance: ECC reporting, scrubbing, watchdog escalation and common-cause fault injection
Observed boundary: Checkpoint tampering rejected in software
Required evidence: Radiation/SEU test plan for declared components and environment
Standards apply to a declared system and risk
IEC 61508 safety integrity and ISO 26262 automotive ASIL selection require hazard/risk analysis. DO-178C applies to airborne software assurance; ECSS covers mission-tailored space engineering. ISO/IEC 27001 and 27033 address ISMS and network security. 9100 addresses organizational quality. POSIX interfaces do not constitute a workload timing proof.
- IEC functional safety overview
- ISO road-vehicle functional safety
- FAA airborne software assurance
- ECSS software engineering
- ISO/IEC 27001 · ISO/IEC 27033
- IAQG quality standards
- POSIX system interfaces
- IEEE precision clock synchronization
- Formal proof assumptions: seL4
Public primary descriptions consulted; normative clauses and certificates are not implied. A nanosecond timestamp resolution does not establish a nanosecond task deadline guarantee; preallocation alone does not prove leak freedom; digest custody is separate from signing authority and WORM retention.
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